On the Making of Muslims in India Historically*

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Abstract

Part of a larger work on the social background to the Partition, in 1947, this paper offers a long historical view on the making of the ‘Muslim’ category in south Asia. During the medieval period, a wide range of processes and considerations drew indigenes to the new faith; yet it remained a dispersed and fragmented category. Late in nineteenth century, simultaneously with the rise of other movements for religious revival (for example, Arya Samaj), a major initiative for Islamic revival, especially in north India, took the form of a large madrasa at Deoband in western UP, training Islamic scholars, using the new printing presses to publish religious texts, issuing vast numbers of fatwas to guide the faithful towards a true Islamic life. The paper suggests that the slowly rising levels of contention between ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’, from early nineteenth century on, accelerated the trend towards exclusive religious identities, the umma in the case of Muslims. It explores too the virtual absence of lower caste revolts among Muslims. On balance, the strength of the religious orthodoxy has inhibited the exposure to western learning; and, until recently, Muslim initiatives at building institutions of modern learning have been scarce in India.

In the sociological understanding of India, the place of Muslims has been notably inconspicuous. Various aspects of the situation have contributed to this neglect. I shall mention only three here. First, ideologically, the ‘national movement’ (say in Indian National Congress) sought to ignore all marks of difference within Indian society. In the words of a student of feminism, an ‘emptying of India’s history of all conflicts characterises the dominant nationalist grid for imagining both the nation and its past’. A scholar working with the categories ‘Muslim’ and ‘Hindu’ has at times been accused of

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Razi Aquil has engaged with me on earlier versions of this text, enriching it substantially; and Mushirul Hasan has discussed many of its themes with me. T.N. Madan, Farah Naqvi, and Bajrang Tiwari read an earlier draft critically. I hope to respond to Professor Madan’s comments on another occasion. I owe much to their encouragement – but accept responsibility for what remains.

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displaying a communal outlook himself. Second, conceptually, insofar as the dominant grid for apprehending society in India has been in terms of the caste order, it was relatively easy to show the importance of castes, or caste analogues, in Muslim social organisation: this was taken as its central feature. And third, methodologically, Indian sociologists have been largely unconcerned with long-term historical developments: how exactly did South Asia’s enormous Muslim population become ‘Muslim’; how exactly have their ideological currents over the generations changed their conceptions of themselves – and of their ‘others’?

My own interest in the theme was sharpened during a weeklong visit to Lahore in March 2000. Dr. Mohammad Jawwal of the Department of Philosophy, Punjab University, Lahore, very kindly introduced me to his students, and invited them to ask me any questions they wished to ask. One student asked: ‘We find that there is a good deal common between people in India and Pakistan. Why then did we have the Partition?’ My response was quite unsatisfactory, at least to myself, and the question has continued to trouble me since then. The question could not be answered in terms of the caste system; and it directed attention, on one side, to the categories Muslim and Hindu and, on the other, to the historical processes that had preceded the decision to Partition. I have done some preliminary analyses of that theme; this essay does not consider it. As I explored the numerous aspects to the question, however, it became clear that I needed a connected understanding of the shaping of what might be called the Muslim social space in India through the centuries. It is this latter, which will concern me in these pages.

Back in the 1960s, there appeared a rash of interpretations of the Islamic tradition in the South Asian subcontinent.: Qureshi 1962, Aziz Ahmad 1964, Mujeeb 1967 (to these may be added Andre Wink’s more ambitious recent work, 1990 and 1997 – a third volume is awaited). A substantial corpus of sociologically sensitive work by historians has become available subsequently. This included studies on regions (UP, Bengal, Punjab) and on institutions (Deoband, Bareli, Nadwa, Tablighi Jamaat) whose agendas – religious, social, cultural – have helped reconfigure the Indian social space in a manner that eclipsed the caste identities among Muslims.

A review of the recruitment of Indians into the Muslim category during medieval period opens this essay. There were moments of contention in all this, but the process was largely peaceful, for powerful restraints were at work. The establishment of colonial power by the nineteenth century was a cause for uncertainty and anxiety for a great many; and I shall consider the kind of resources that Muslims were able to summon for coping with their circumstances and in facing the future. A major initiative came to be centred in the Islamic seminary at Deoband from 1860s on, fostering a sense of community, the umma, among all the Muslims dispersed all over the subcontinent; and its intensity grew dramatically as the Tablighi Jamaat worked out a distinctive style, making all Muslims responsible for spreading the faith.

Muslims in India have not lived in a limbo, in a world apart. They have been part of the larger society. Yet, this category has been a persistent node for drives to foster a distinctive sense of community, so there is a particular story to tell. Here I proceed on the
assumption that it may be fruitful to examine these social logics on their own terms. How justified the assumption is, the reader will judge.

The making of Indian Muslims, 6 or, the various modes of ‘Conversion’

Large numbers in India came under Islam’s influence, with concentrations in the northwest and in eastern Bengal. While eighth century Kerala and Sind already had significant numbers of Arab sailors and rulers – and their descendants – respectively, Islam spread elsewhere during the centuries after Saltanat was established in north India, making things easier for Islamic religious workers in some parts of the subcontinent. The process was slow; and there was not much effort at creating a distinctive Islamic community, marked off from its non-Muslim neighbours. What followed has been variable, shaped as diverse actors, in particular localities, have pursued a variety of agendas and have responded to what others did. Some ulama might have wished that the new converts live by the shariat, the laws of Islam; but medieval rulers in India were rarely theocratic; and, until the nineteenth century, as we shall see, the bulk of the ulama have been in no great hurry to enforce doctrinal conformity.

In conversions, as in other matters, some rulers did use both the carrot and the stick, off and on, but more gradual processes have also been at work. Each case is unique. The social complexity among Hindus – their sects, castes, languages – is well known; that among Muslims was even greater; for example, what had been the immigrant ruling class, the high status ashraf, had forged alliances with high status indigenous groups; but, commonly the former had kept a distance from the indigenous converts of lower caste and artisanal backgrounds, the ajlaf. Until the nineteenth century, the ashraf–ajlaf line was almost as sharp as that between upper and lower caste Hindus, though it began to soften during the nineteenth century, as we shall see.

This section explores some of the ways in which people ‘became’ Muslim – or, less self-consciously, came to be recognised as Muslims. This variety of ways may be arrayed along a continuum. At one end was the personal influence of Muslim religious men; and the great bulk of the Muslim population in the subcontinent has descended from those who turned to Islam under such influence. In the middle were what might be called political conversions: some people took to Islam in anticipation of economic opportunity, or of gaining political favour, or of escaping political disfavour; others found that their proximity to (Muslim) rulers, possibly sharing food and drink with them, made them unwelcome to their Hindu castemates, and then the conversion could be a consequence of such proximity. At the other end was coercion which, we shall see, could take various scales and forms.
Influence of religious men

More than sixty years ago, Nirmal Kumar Bose wrote of what he called the ‘Hindu method of tribal absorption’ (1941/1967), citing instances of the Juang from central Orissa and the Oraon and Munda from the latter-day Jharkhand. A tribal group at the edge of Brahminical society would gradually absorb Hindu elements in its ritual, deities, and concepts, while maintaining large parts of its older cultural beliefs and practices; and, enjoying a virtual monopoly of a particular craft manufacture, it would enter into economic relationships with the wider society. Over time, its members might find a place in the caste hierarchy, usually at a low level; but Surajit Sinha showed that a ruling group within a tribal society would be assimilated with the Rajputs.

We may speak similarly of a Muslim method of tribal absorption – a general model of gradual change of religious identities, ranging from being nominal to being thorough. In many cases, affiliating with some elements of Islamic tradition was a simple matter, with only minimal shift in religious practice or in the group’s social locus: a seamless re-arranging of indigenous and Islamic beliefs and practices. Where the social framework of the caste order was already in place, such a group would continue to live, and function, much as it had previously. In Tamil areas, Susan Bayly finds numerous wealthy and influential Muslim communities in port towns, going back to the ninth or tenth centuries, which had provided extensive maritime links between the Arab world, the west coast, and southeast Asia; wandering Sufis, from the thirteenth century on, relating to pastoral and forest peoples; and Sufi saints’ tombs being seen as bearers of supernatural power and drawing seekers of different sorts.

In a study of extraordinary range and depth, centred on Rajasthan but stretching over all northern India, Dominique-Sila Khan has sought to recover the little remembered Ismaili missionaries, also known as Nizaris, who were active especially in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was a time of diverse religious tendencies, both indigenous and Islamic. The Ismailis’ style was remarkably flexible, illustrated in one major figure: ‘The Nizari … Hasan Kabiruddin [d. 1470?]’ himself acquired two additional personalities, first as a Suhrawardi Sufi Pir named ‘Hasan Darya’ and second as a Shaiva ascetic, clad in ochre-coloured clothes, as ‘Anand-jo-dhani’. The Ismaili tradition had sanctioned taqiyya, the practice of camouflaging one’s true faith in adverse circumstances, say of Sunni hostility; and so we get a complex, fragmented story of numerous distinctive groups, with their usually secret beliefs and ceremonies, which drew on the diverse traditions flourishing in their milieu. The Ismaili missionaries and their local disciples connected especially well with the lower castes owing to their egalitarian style.

These various groups drifted apart over the centuries, into three principal channels:

i. some erstwhile Ismailis took to ‘orthodox’ Sunni ways, largely abandoning their earlier complex heritage;
ii. some others have inflected their legends and practices to approximate one or another Hindu model, while preserving Ismaili elements, partly secretly; and

iii. finally, the Khojas: after the first Aga Khan moved to India in about 1840, he urged Ismailis, who observed their faith in secrecy, to come into the open since secrecy was no longer necessary.\textsuperscript{12}

**Eastern Bengal:** Richard Eaton has examined the spread of Islam in Bengal meticulously, especially in its eastern parts, since before 1204, the time when the Saltanat regime was first established there. For an overwhelming majority of the people who became Muslims, the process he describes was one not of ‘conversion’ in a particular moment but of constituting a community, initially for an economic activity, that of clearing densely forested land, under the leadership of a man of religion, a *maulvi* and the like. Apart from contemporary observers’ records, he draws on evidence of epigraphy, numismatics, architecture, and artwork to produce a thick analysis. It enables him to demonstrate:

i. that by far the largest increases in the Muslim population in rural eastern Bengal came in the wake of the Mughal conquest of the region, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries;

ii. that this was *not* a consequence of pressure from the state; the Mughal administration took pains to ensure that its officials would not engage in proselytising\textsuperscript{13}. Rather, it was part of the process of clearing, for paddy cultivation, lands which had until then been thickly forested; this major economic shift followed from Mughal search for revenue from these hitherto forested territories. The spread of Islam followed principally from the ability of pioneering Muslim religious men to draw forest and hill people, and others of diverse religious backgrounds, into labouring groups, which they formed for clearing the forestlands. The communities so forming took on the religious practices of the men who had drawn them together – there was no particular moment of ‘conversion’ in the whole process; and

iii. that in a vast region, where there were few previously established rights over land, the Muslim religious men’s initial claims took varied routes in different regions: they might install themselves, and their followers, in virgin land, clearing it for paddy, and then seek recognition from Mughal authority as collectors of revenue for the government\textsuperscript{14}; they might buy ‘permanent land tenure rights’ from ‘non-cultivating intermediaries, or *zamindars*, high caste Hindus, who had acquired the rights from Mughal authorities, but who would not do the work themselves owing to ‘social taboos’\textsuperscript{15}; or they might get a land-grant from the government for bringing land into cultivation and ‘to promote Islamic piety in the countryside’\textsuperscript{16}.

Men entering these relationships and communities carried with them their prior ideas concerning the supernatural. From such beginnings, the passage to a relatively sharp and self-conscious identification with Islam took more than two centuries. Eaton
sees them as journeying through three distinct phases in relation to beliefs, symbols, and practices:

i. **inclusion:** Islamic elements were mixed into the prior stock of beliefs and practices concerning the supernatural, as often happens in folk practice;17

ii. **identification:** particular Islamic figures came to be identified with specific indigenous ones, as being the ‘same’, or as being linked with each other in specified relationships, say one being the avatar of the other;18 and

iii. **displacement:** a process beginning in early nineteenth century, in a colonial milieu, once the political reasons for mutual accommodation, coming from the Mughals and their successor states, had worn off. Religious identities and practices began to move from being relatively fuzzy to being more sharply defined.19 There have been long-term pressures, as we shall see in the cases both of the Meo and of eastern Bengal below, to remove the pre-Islamic beliefs and practices, in the cause of securing what some believed to be purer Islamic beliefs and practices.

For the Muslim religious men in Bengal, Eaton is our guide:

...from the culture of institutional Sufism came the asymmetric categories of **pir** and **murid**, or **shaikh** and disciple, which rendered Sufism a suitable model for channelling authority, distributing patronage, and maintaining discipline – the very requirements appropriate to the business of organising and mobilising labour in regions along the cutting edge of state power. It is little wonder that Sufis appeared along East Bengal’s forested frontier.20

The forested delta had earlier been populated only thinly. Pivotal to the spread of Islam in this setting were the Muslim religious men, and their ability to relate to others in an open-ended manner; this was in sharp contrast with the attitude of long-settled Brahmins in western Bengal who considered lands further east, inhabited largely by ‘tribal’ peoples, as being ritually polluted, not really suited for Brahmins to live in.21 As later generations remembered it, the challenge was ‘the forest, a wild and dangerous domain that [the Sufis] were believed to have subdued; .. the supernatural world ... with which they were believed to wield continuing influence’.22 The forest was the same. The Brahmins ignored it; the Sufis embraced it, aided no doubt by their own long held belief in their superior hold over supernatural forces.

This region the Muslim religious men entered vigorously. The difference arose not only in the Brahmins’ preoccupation with purity and pollution, which lay at the core of the social order over which they presided; it arose also in differences of social
organisation. In reclaiming forestland for paddy, the Muslim religious men drew to themselves individuals and small groups – not whole jatis proud of their collective identities from the past. The land rights that these men would acquire arose from their participation in work which had been organised by the men of religion. People entering the communities being formed had not had much of a caste order; they had no stake in the ideology underlying the caste order, which has been part of a wider Hindu ethos. In the society that emerged in eastern Bengal, consequently, Muslims enjoyed an overwhelming preponderance.

Similarly in Punjab. Here again Eaton has uncovered the evidence. Between the seventh and the eleventh centuries, Jat pastoralists moved up ‘from Sind into the Multan area’. By the thirteenth century, they were settling between the Sutlej and the Ravi; by c.1600, they had spread greatly, becoming ‘the dominant agrarian caste’23. Many, meanwhile, were accepting Islam too. Eaton tracks the process by analysing a set of fourteen genealogical charts of prominent Siyal families available in a mid-nineteenth century publication. Distributing the names in the charts between ‘Punjabi secular names’ and ‘Muslim names’, he finds that the latter begin to appear in early 1400s, become a majority by mid-1600s, and a hundred percent by 1815, indexing a slow, barely conscious, process of entering Islam24.

Political conversions

One might take to Islam in anticipation of economic opportunity, or of political favours, or of escaping disfavour; or it could be a consequence of proximity to rulers.25 Analysing an early nineteenth century report about a village in Kaira District, Gujarat, A.M. Shah has written about a Muslim Rathod Rajput group whose members accepted Islam, in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, owing to ‘the policy of the Sultans of Gujarat of creating such social groups in the region as would provide abiding support to their political authority’26. Apropos a late nineteenth century court case concerning property, the historian Asiya Siddiqi considers a Muslim butcher family, apparently descendants from Dhangar jati in Maharashtra, cattle breeders and shepherds by traditional occupation. Siddiqi surmises that at the time of the first Saltanat conquests of the Deccan, about the thirteenth century, an opportunity for supplying meat to the substantial Muslim population would have arisen. In response, some Dhangar would have converted to Islam ‘in order to meet the canonical requirement for slaughter (zabiha)’ of animals.27 In both cases, Rajput and Dhangar, the Hindu and the Muslim families had maintained close relationships with each other.

The Meo of Mewat: Numbering rather more than 300,000, the Meo of Mewat, in the districts southwest of Delhi, are a mainly rural, land-owning caste, with a self-image of being Rajputs, of having been warriors in the past; they are also Muslims. When and how they took to Islam has been a matter of folk memory – which places the move variously between the eighth and the seventeenth centuries. In some versions of this memory, the
use of force was a sporadic element in their conversion. After reviewing various reports, Partap Aggarwal concludes, ‘The Meos, because of their active interest in Delhi politics, were constantly under pressure to accept Islam for its value as a useful protective shield’.28 Until the mid-1940s, the Meo carried their Islam lightly, functioning as a dominant caste, quite like other large land-owning castes, confident of their place within the caste order. They were firm in marrying within their caste, following their own rules, ignoring the more common Islamic ideas about kin preferred for marriages, as well as the possibility of marrying non-Meo Muslims. They patronised Brahmins, who legitimised the high Meo place within the hierarchy, and they lived by the ideas of purity and pollution, much like the other high castes but they did not employ Brahmins in ritual roles. Their rituals, say at marriages, had forms that they largely shared with Rajputs, except that it was the father’s sister who would act the ‘priest’ in place of a Brahmin. In effect, they were a cluster of Rajput clans. What identified them as Muslim was the following: their names, their occasional recourse to mosques, their practice of circumcision, and their burying, not cremating, their dead; that was about all29.

The Meo and their neighbours participated in a variety of festivals in a relaxed manner; Muharram was occasion for a common *mela*, and there were various shared sacred personages. Engaged almost exclusively in agriculture, the Meo had travelled very little outside Mewat and had only limited contact with the outer world. Since the mid-1940s, however, the Meo have changed course substantially30.

**Coercion**

Among the better-known cases of coercion for enlarging the reach of Islam is that of Kashmir at the end of the fourteenth century. Against this position it is argued that large numbers in fact took to Islam in order to escape the caste hierarchy31. It may be that the force was directed especially at the Brahmins, kingpins of the caste order; and once they converted, or emigrated, however temporarily, the lower castes would accept Islam voluntarily. Coercion on a small scale is illustrated in a late seventeenth century case concerning a Chief of Gautam Rajputs from the Azamgarh area in UP: ‘one Bikramajit Singh … had hatched [a conspiracy] to kill his brother’; he ‘had to become Muslim to avoid execution at Aurangzeh’s order’.32 Granted the incidents of coercion, on scales large and small, it remains true that the largest blocks accepted Islam through absorption, not through coercion.33

In sum, then, the streams of Islam spread through the subcontinent through a variety of channels. The emphasis, by and large, was on having Islam accepted, by saying the *kalima*, often under the influence of Sufis and their grace; beyond that, the prevailing social arrangements were disturbed only minimally. The streams spread, finding their own levels and courses locally; there was no centre to give direction or shape strategy. The *ulama* might chafe at all the unIslamic goings on, but they had neither the resources nor the will to work on a general promulgation, say, of *shariat*. 
Yet a subtle pressure towards Islamising has been at work in certain settings. The pressure arose in the ulama’s informal networks and in the Sufi orders that strung numerous Sufis together. From their viewpoint, how well a convert from a Hindu background could be accepted into Muslim society, and what status he could be accorded as a Muslim, would be a function of how well he had erased his origin as a Hindu – and how well he maintained a distance from Hindu society\(^3\). Muslim leaders in the subcontinent have long had continual anxieties about their followers – a relatively small, if growing, part of the population – being absorbed by the capacious Hindu society around them. The prospect of acceptance and appreciation among Muslims was a lever they could use for those who would commit themselves unambiguously to the tenets of Islam.

**Facing the future: Gathering the Umma, alternate visions**

Pre-colonial periods had seen the message of Islam reaching vast numbers in the subcontinent, and it had been the faith of dominant sections of the ruling class. Their descendants, as well as those of the erstwhile Hindu ruling groups, were disempowered in British India. Religious elites, Muslim and Hindu, had always stood apart; with the passing of the Mughals and their successor regime in Awadh, the political elite too bifurcated. Throughout northern and eastern India, furthermore, few substantial merchants were Muslim; and, therefore, they could partake little of the commercial, and later industrial, wealth, limited as it was, generated during the colonial period. Finally, while the segmentation inherent in the caste order is well recognised, the following discussion will show that the social fragmentation of Muslims at this time may have been no less than that of Hindus. Looking to the future in the nineteenth century, some of the leading Muslim men thought they faced a difficult situation. The magnitude of their difficulty will become clearer if we first consider the social composition of the category at the time.

**Social composition of ‘Indian Muslims’**

If we look back, say, from the end of the nineteenth century, the ancestors of Muslims in India can be tracked in several directions. One fraction descended from immigrants: merchants along the coast in Kerala and Tamil Nadu; and in north India, members of ruling dynasties and others in the ruling class, their religious mentors and the like. Then there were the indigenous peasantries, especially numerous in Bengal, Punjab, and Kashmir; the tribes of Balochistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP); and Hindu converts to Islam, some of whom were of upper caste backgrounds, including the Khoja and Bohra merchants in Gujarat. In this dispersed social space, I shall dwell especially on two categories: the literati and the merchants.
Descendants of immigrants: Their numbers were relatively small, with a concentration in northern India. As rulers, their ancestors had built open ruling coalitions, and promulgated policies of fair governance, whatever the lapses in practice. At least before Aurangzeb’s wars, the Mughal dynasty, and its ruling class, had controlled fabulous wealth, thanks to its tax collection apparatus, and its officials’ ability at times to use the strong arm in relation to merchants and their wealth.

Aristocracies in decline are caught in situations fraught with difficulties. Their sense of the past gives them pride and a sense of superiority; their declining present makes them anxious for the future. In retrospect, the Mughal achievement had rested on the close cooperation between the immigrant ruling class and indigenous groups: leading Rajput families and administrators from various backgrounds, not to mention people in commerce, the fine arts, and other fields. The collapse of that edifice revealed that the descendants of immigrant groups commanded, and transmitted within their families, a rather limited range of skills. In the premodern world, control over land was often the principal form in which wealth could be accumulated and stored. Continuing from their roles in the vanished dynasties, some of them had estates; and following the upheaval in Delhi in 1857, many shifted to their estates, or the small towns near the properties, creating there the attractive Qasbati culture about which Mushirul Hasan has written eloquently. Some found employment in princely states, especially Hyderabad and Bhopal. Some others projected large visions: Syed Ahmad Khan worked imaginatively at presenting a positive image of Muslims and, recognising the importance of western learning, at building the college at Aligarh (estd. 1875); and a group of religious scholars, recognising the widespread inadequacies in the knowledge, and the practice, of Islam, established an influential madrasa at Deoband (1867) for training Islamic scholars rigorously.

One difficulty was that their principal ancestral skill was in a certain kind of governing – a function being pre-empted by the British. They still had their estates, but also rather expansive lifestyles, putting many families on the defensive, though some, like the Kidwais, who recognised the value of the new education early, moved confidently into a variety of modern occupations. Their qasbati descendants cultivated a literary creativity, and some found employment in the early colonial order: in the courts, and as Urdu teachers. Of the several regions, Muslims in U. P. and Bihar held their own, and more, in higher education, professions, and government employment.

Given the change of political regimes, the heirs to the former ruling class saw themselves as sliding economically, and therefore socially: partly, the division of properties in successive generations, partly their properties going to the market, passing slowly to Hindu moneylenders and others who commanded cash. Immersed in an ocean of indigenes, they held to their marks of distinction emblematically: their lifestyle, their origins in west and central Asia, and Islam. By and large, they were too anxious about individual situations to be able to spare the energy for institutional initiatives for the future.

This is not the place to dilate on the versatility of the Islamic intellectual tradition, as it flourished under the Abbasids and immediately following, between the eighth and
the tenth centuries: leaving aside the systematising of Islamic law, and poetry and literary criticism, the philosophers built on the Greek tradition and, in turn, contributed much to European thought from their bases in Spain; and there was much ‘discussion of points of religious belief on the basis of rational criteria’⁴⁰. The Saltanat, Mughal, and other Muslim dynasties’ central concern was to maintain their kingships and empires and their revenues. They were generous to madrasas, around learned families, and to religious learning there. Aurangzeb made an endowment towards the famous Farangi Mahall in Lucknow; its instruction was relatively secular, being oriented towards administrative employment⁴¹. Learned men, coming from west Asia, or cultivating their learning within family circles, often graced the royal courts; but the rulers did not foster major institutions of secular learning in the subcontinent. Systematic thought in the old philosophical traditions, like the Mutazilis, had fallen off. Consequently, by the nineteenth century, the ‘Muslim’ literati were concentrated substantially in religious learning, and in literary activity, like the poet Ghalib. The effort to promote the use of secular reason and of scientific observation, even by Syed Ahmad Khan, had to retreat before the writ of the religious orthodoxy.

The vast majority of Muslims in India have, of course, been indigenous in their ancestry – whatever the lure of such appellations as Sayyid, Shaikh, Qureshi, and Ansari as tokens of status within Islamic space. We have seen the making of the large blocks of Muslim populations in Bengal and Punjab. In both regions, they were overwhelmingly rural, cultivators. A series of Sufi establishments in western Punjab had sizable landholdings. The colonial regime took local leaders into its apparatus in its lower ranks, rewarding its loyal servants with honours, grants of land, opportunities to rise in government, and the like⁴².

The need to market their produce led Punjabi Muslim landowners to market towns and to their Hindu and Sikh merchants (who would double as moneylenders), giving Muslim landholders a distinctive identity – and a sense of class opposition to the merchants. The British solicitude for Punjabi cultivators, backbone of the imperial army, led to the Land Alienation Act (LAA), 1900. It excluded non-cultivating castes, like the merchants, from buying agricultural land – thereby strengthening the cultivators against the moneylenders, for the latter could no longer foreclose on mortgages against land. The class opposition built into LAA provided the basis for a cross-communal political alliance, under the banner of the Unionist Party, for a generation immediately before Partition⁴³.

The Dogra Hindu rulership in Kashmir had emerged in the wake of the Sikh-British wars, in mid-1800s. Its highest rungs were largely in the hands of men drawn from the dominant Hindu Pandit landowners. Early in the twentieth century, opposition to the dominant groups began to rise around a growing Islamic consciousness in the tenantry, aided by Kashmiri Muslim migrants in Punjab⁴⁴.

Islamisation in eastern Bengal was deepened as Bengali Muslims began to make the distant pilgrimage to Mecca in the nineteenth century. There they encountered religiosity in forms contrasting starkly with those familiar back home. The most influential of these was Haji Shariatullah (d. 1840) who went to Mecca in 1799 at age 18,
studied there for nineteen years, and, returning to Bengal in 1818, worked tirelessly to have the practice of Islam, in forms encountered in Mecca, displace the prevailing Bengali practices.\footnote{45}

In the relations between Muslims and Hindus in eastern Bengal, there was often also an opposition of interests: the Hindus were absentee landlords, moneylenders, and educated government officials, whom the Muslim peasants generally faced from a position of weakness. In responding positively to the nineteenth century Islamising movements, therefore, they were also distancing themselves from their high caste Hindu neighbours and landlords, and even, in some measure, from their Bengali legacy.\footnote{46}

Pradip Kumar Datta\footnote{47} and Ranabir Samaddar have written of the leaders of Bengali Muslims in the first half of twentieth century: of their writings and efforts at mobilising along diverse axes, and at capacity building by way of education. They were shaping a distinctive identity around Islam, and in opposition to the domination of Hindu landowners, whose children had been taking over the new professions too.

\textbf{Merchants:} Nineteenth century north India had few important Muslim merchants.\footnote{48} Hindu and Jain merchants’ strong skills, and their ramifying, established networks of caste and kinship underwriting their commerce, may have given them an edge over any possible newcomers, presenting formidable ‘entry barriers’ to new groups; Mughals, in any case, had no difficulties in establishing satisfactory relationships with indigenous merchants; and, later, when Mughal and successor regimes faced difficulties, they drew on the services of Hindu financiers. In their comprehensive survey of western, northern, and eastern India, Subramanian and Ray\footnote{49} found substantial ship-owning Muslim merchants in seventeenth century Surat, their oceanic trade with west Asia favoured somewhat by the Mughal regime; but they began to lose ground as the English company edged the indigenous regime out, thanks to help from Hindu merchants. Since the eighteenth century, the Calcutta region too had a few major Muslim merchants here and there.\footnote{50}

In the north, major Muslim merchants have been scarce. Narayani Gupta\footnote{51} has identified two clusters of substantial Punjabi Muslim merchants in Delhi in later nineteenth century: an earlier cluster had built on an extensive shoe trade – a commodity Hindu merchant castes may then have avoided – and a later group of wholesalers who grew to dominate Delhi’s Sadar Bazar. For early twentieth century, Markovits\footnote{52} notices Sir Syed Maratib Ali whose company ‘became the largest contractor of military canteens in the Punjab, a hugely profitable activity …’.

Exploring the social and political attitudes among Muslims during the Saltanat and Mughal empires, Mohammad Mujeeb noted that ‘miserliness was among the universally detested vices, and only a discriminating few would distinguish between miserliness and ordered expenditure, whether of wealth or of sympathy’.\footnote{53} Consequently, ‘The social obligations of the Muslim merchant would bring his wealth into prominence’ – making it difficult for him to conserve his capital, in the face of various pressures to
spend, and to give to those in need; ‘the caste restrictions of the Hindu capitalist kept his possessions concealed’

Mujeeb does not specify any particular period or place, or sources, to which his observations pertain. Given the long history of Arab and Persian commerce, however, we do not expect Muslim merchants’ capital resources to be generally at risk on these grounds; likewise, recent monographic evidence, from eighteenth century Surat in Gujarat or a twentieth century town in Tamil Nadu. It may be that Muslim merchants who attained to any scale in north India found themselves having to live up to the expansive lifestyles in the ruling class – and, later, its descendants. At any time they would have been few in number: too few, on one side, to be able to generate and sustain the values and practices requisite for mercantile success; and too few, on the other side, to be able to repel the attentions of their numerous Hindu rivals.

Western India had Khoja, Bohra, and other Muslim merchant communities. In 1759, in collusion with Hindu trading castes in Surat, the English company merchants forced their way into the government of the city and declared ‘a monopoly over shipping to the Gulfs, delivering thereby a body-blow to the Muslim ship-owning merchants of Surat’.

As is well known, Muslims in south India, by and large, have been comfortable in their regional languages and social contexts. They have descended partly from Arab and Persian traders who married local women and settled down, and partly from those who came under the influence of Sufis, seen as holy men. Many of them have been changing slowly to conform to the tenets of Islam more closely. In northern Kerala, Muslim peasants, known as Moplah, had found their land rights reduced sharply by the colonial regime, setting them against powerful (Hindu) landlords allied with the government. Thanks to devoted religious leaders, they were able to translate their agrarian discontent into organised action. During Khilafat and Non-cooperation, the local tenancy issues were also raised as part of the agitation; and a long tradition of assertiveness came to be directed against the Hindu landlords too.

**Gathering the Umma, forging the community**

By early twentieth century, a body of consensual opinion in Muslim space, the *umma*, and a corresponding sense of community, were emerging, and we can track the process with some precision. The forging of that consensus has been pivotal to the social history of the Muslim space in modern India. Complex processes converged upon it; and its long-term consequences have been equally complex. Here we consider the processes that led to the sense of the *umma*.

One can argue that the eighteenth century Muslim space in the subcontinent was even more diverse, unorganised, than the then Hindu social space. Before the nineteenth century, there had been only a modest effort to draw Muslims in the subcontinent into a distinctive social organisation. Islam’s experience elsewhere, from west Africa to central
Asia, had been that people in a region would take to the new faith wholesale: such Islamic forms as the mosque, the prayer, the Sufi’s tomb, the maulvi, and the pilgrimage would settle into the earlier social organisation seamlessly. India, it turned out, had ancient religious traditions, entrenched socially in the caste order. In that milieu, Islam found a place too though, at least in north India, religious specialists on both sides saw the arrangements as provisional, weak on justifications.

Most Muslims in the subcontinent – Sind, Punjab, Delhi and vicinity, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Malabar and elsewhere – were indigenes, spoke the local language, and were part of their respective regional societies. Urban centres like Calcutta, Hyderabad, and Madras had Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants. For Calcutta, we learn from Rafiuddin Ahmed that the Urdu-speaking, Shia, elite who saw themselves as high status ashrāf, took little interest in the rural Bengali-speaking Muslims, whom they saw as low status ajlaf (atrap in Bengali), at least until after the results of the first Census (1872). Until then the Urdu-speaking ashrāf had sought British patronage to advance themselves, rather like Brahmins in Maharashtra. The Census revealed a surprisingly large majority of Muslims in Bengal, being concentrated in the eastern parts. Subsequently, the ulama in rural Bengal helped mediate across the ashrāf-ajlaf disconnect, helping Muslims emerge as a political entity, sharing interests, as Muslims, against Bengali Hindus. This was a widespread cleavage among Muslims that the ulama had helped transcend; the madrasa at Deoband and its graduates promulgated an ideology that carried a similar vision for the entire subcontinent. We shall return to this theme shortly.

In north India, the lives of the medieval Muslim elite – religious or political – had turned significantly on Muslim rulers being close at hand. That era had ended by early nineteenth century; yet various Muslim groups could function on reasonable terms under British auspices. ‘In 1825, the East India Company took over an existing madrasa…’ in Delhi. Its new curriculum included Persian, Arabic, Sanskrit, and English as languages, and the western sciences, taught in ‘the medium of Urdu’; supported by a major programme of translations from Arabic, Persian and English into Urdu. The social composition and the vigorous activity at Delhi College seemed to augur a future of productive cooperation between Muslims, Europeans, and Hindus. After the disruption of 1857, Delhi College lingered for a while as a shell of an institution; yet the experience of its peak years lived on in diverse ways through its teachers and students: in Delhi’s cosmopolitan culture later in the century, explored at length by Mushirul Hasan (see below), and also in providing a model for at least one major institution of religious instruction later, the madrasa at Deoband.

1857, however, saw an assault, especially in Delhi, in which Muslims, religious or lay, often found themselves defenceless; in the heat of the moment, they were taken by the British to be guilty of rebellion unless they could prove it otherwise. As the dust of the uprising in 1857 settled down, a difficult situation could be seen to be emerging for Muslims. Seen from above, from the viewpoint of the ashrāf, principally the descendants of the immigrants, they were probably less than a tenth of all Muslims in the subcontinent, and the great bulk of the non-ashraf, especially in rural areas, often merged with their neighbours, who were not Muslim, more or less indistinguishably.
A major response to the situation was inspired by the thought of the eighteenth century Islamic scholar, Waliullah, meditating on the remains of empire in Delhi. Islam had reached large numbers in the subcontinent, however imperfect their observances and their awareness of religious obligations. It fell to Waliullah to think through the prospect of Islam in India even as the buttresses of power fell away. Assured the guidance of religious preceptors, the community of Islam in India could yet be fostered, providing the conditions for pious lives, shaped according to shariat, Islamic law. This eighteenth century vision responded to the anxieties that were then beginning to rise. It took several generations for these anxieties to become acute enough to spur initiatives for trying to realise it; and, by then, novel institutional forms and powerful technologies were also at hand for launching major exercises in social re-structuring.

Perhaps the most influential expression of that purpose took the form of an unusually large, and well organised, madrasa at Deoband, founded in 1867, and the other institutions that it subsequently inspired. Among Muslims in mid-nineteenth century UP, the ulama, religious scholars, had become a dominant voice in the social leadership, influencing social choices significantly. Deoband would train men who would be knowledgeable in the scriptures and in shariat; and the ulama at Deoband were affiliating with the Sufi traditions too, appropriating their charisma to their own teaching. Fired with a vision of a thoroughly Islamic community, the products of Deoband would work from the ubiquitous mosques. Shortly thereafter, Syed Ahmed Khan promoted the establishment of the college at Aligarh, which later became the University. The college would equip ashraf men with western education for working in government and the new occupations. Aligarh and Deoband drew support from Muslim landlords and the princely states of Hyderabad, Bhopal, and Rampur, and the officials working there and elsewhere; and Aligarh was critically dependent on government support right from the beginning.

Deoband and Syed Ahmad Khan were firmly Sunni. Their networks may not have reached much towards the Shia Bohras and Khojas in Gujarat and Bombay, possibly owing to memories of bad blood over the centuries, at least between the Ismaili Bohras and the Sunnis in Gujarat. 

**Solidarity amidst Conflicts:** Deoband has maintained a relatively high profile since late nineteenth century; but several other religious tendencies have also been active. Religious differences within Islam are taken very seriously, to the point that rivals may be declared to be kafir, misguided, or even denied the status of being Muslims at all. Contestation between the various Sunni schools has often been such that these may find it difficult to cooperate – as in the case of the Nadwat al-ulama, Nadwa in short, an institution launched in the 1890s. An explicit intention of promoting doctrinal rapprochement between the several Islamic sects had inspired its founding; within less than two decades, almost all tendencies but Deobandi had been removed from its councils.

Yet, conducted within a broadly shared field of ideas and assumptions, doctrinal contestation can help raise an awareness of that tradition, of Islamic consciousness, of the umma. Apropos ‘Islamic unity’, at least the preponderant Sunni schools – Ahl-i Hadith, Deobandi, Barelwi – have all shared a commitment to the Prophet, the Quran, and hadith.
Deoband enlarged this core to include *shariat*, the historically emerging ‘laws of Islam’; and Barelwi doctrine went further and recognised the importance of intercession of saints, of visits to their tombs to partake of their sanctity, and the like.  

Despite their disputes, the several groups have shared aspirations towards achieving a purer Islamic way of life, partly by modelling one’s life on that of the Prophet; and distantiating, differentiating, from the Hindus through de-casteing, abandoning folk deities, and the like. (The edge of difference has been no less sharp in relation to the Shia and the Ahmediya.) *All* of them have promoted a sense of Islamic consciousness, of umma, the great community of Islam. The shared ideology influences the prevailing ‘common sense’ – which, then, has to be counted in terms of ‘what the neighbours will think’. Rafiuddin Ahmed illustrated the process in late nineteenth century eastern Bengal: widespread debates between rival Islamic *anjuman*, religio-political associations, propagating somewhat divergent interpretations of Islam. Intra-mural disagreements and debates, and multiple contestations, may well serve to reinforce a consciousness of shared, distinctive religious identity. 

The sense of community, the umma, then, gained strength despite, even because of, all the doctrinal contestation; and it drew energy from other sources. What with Afghani and pan-Islamism, at least some Muslims in India felt the call of a global vision; that unity one could experience during *Hajj*, or in any mosque during *namaz*. For those who became aware that numbers would count in electoral politics, furthermore, the need for the unity of the umma was seen to be important again.

**Community and Conflict:** More than anything else, the sense of the umma grew from a sense of opposition to Hindus. I have argued at length elsewhere that, from early nineteenth century on, the relations between Muslims and Hindus, at least in north India, were changing, owing to a slowly rising spiral of social contention, which over the generations turned into social aggression: symbolic (as in provocative religious processions), societal (as in conversions and *shuddhi*), and physical (as in communal riots). Recurrent conflicts and persistent animosity across the religious line, pressed from both sides, helped strengthen oppositional identities (and, for Muslims, the sense of the umma) – which, of course, was part of a dialectic: oppositional identities and mutual aggression fed on each other. In this milieu of continuing communal conflict, the sense of the umma did indeed gain ground but not perhaps in the manner that the ideologues at Deoband had envisioned.

The social sciences in India are just beginning to discover the implications of the shared experience of collective violence; it helps cement identities. My hypothesis is that the experience (the *push*) of collective violence, along with (the *pull* of) Deoband, Barelwi, and related influences, persuaded growing fractions of Muslims to withdraw into communally marked spaces. Such relocations carry a variety of costs: the physical and economic costs of having to find another home, and the social and emotional costs of having to reconfigure one’s matrix of relationships. Alongside the ideological pulls from
both sides, it was the shared experiences, or threats, of violence that have persuaded people to pay the costs of this reconfiguring.

**Alternatives**

We have reviewed something of the impulses that carried forward the ancient Islamic vision of *umma*, of the community of Islam, during the colonial period. This is the perspective from above, from the scripturalist, *ashraf*, point of view; but there are, in principle, alternate perspectives: that of a *jati* or a new sect; that from below, an *ajlaf* point of view – the possibility of the lowly coming together to assert along *jati* lines, which has been so large a part of the story on the Hindu side; and finally the vision that would relate with non-Muslims positively, and participate in the new modes of learning actively. We move now to consider why these alternatives remained weak.

**Old Jatis and new sects:** Deoband’s core message was to obliterate allegiance to *jati* like groups and sects in favour of the mainline Sunni teachings as interpreted from Deoband. For this submergence of old *jatis* and new sects for doctrinal purity, various groups may have paid a price; for several of those who retained their distinctive identities have flourished. From their trading beginnings in Sindh, Khojas were drawn to the Shia Ismaili banner, with their own Agha Khan; and they have moved spectacularly into large-scale commerce. Even the Ahmediyas have done remarkably well internationally - though, in Pakistan, the Sunni establishment has been harsh on them. Hasan has recently documented the remarkable Kidwai clan from Awadh in UP: many of its members have done well in a setting which other Muslims often find unfriendly. These groups’ track records stand in sharp contrast with those of groups upon whom Deoband and the like have cast their spell.

**The Ajlaf option:** We may try to account for the weakness of *ajlaf* assertion, in comparative spirit, through reflection from the corresponding viewpoint in the Hindu space, for the *ajlaf* had originated among pastoralists, forest people, peasants, artisans, and other service castes – relatively low in the caste hierarchy – and had carried their caste identities with them. The *ashraf-ajlaf* hierarchy is sometimes compared with the caste order; but there were differences. In Tamil Nadu, it may have been absent altogether; and Islamic religious authorities deny any place for caste identities and caste hierarchy, and associated differences, in Islam. Yet, at least in UP and Bihar, there are reports of the *ajlaf* – the lower castes among Muslims – having been dominated and exploited. So the question remains: why were they respectful of the religious authorities’ opinion, in contrast to the militancy of so many lower Hindu castes?

Muslims have been stratified, to be sure, and have had their internal social separations. Papiya Ghosh has shown that, in Bihar, both before and after 1947, Muslims identified as Momin, formerly weavers, sometimes called Ansari, and other similar occupational groups, have mobilised in politics actively, in explicit opposition to high status, *ashraf*, groups, alleging that Muslim League had represented the interests only of the latter; the Momins have been effective in securing political representation – and all that flows from it. How widespread the pattern has been remains unclear.
Without an ideologically reinforced criterion of purity and pollution, however, these social separations were not as humiliating for the *ajlaf* as their analogues were among lower castes Hindus. Late nineteenth century dyers in Bombay ‘reminisced that their ancestors had converted to Islam because they had had differences with the Hindu priests’: dyers ‘used urine in the process of dyeing, and... would most likely be considered ritually unclean by the orthodox’82. Muslims might be less anxious about the practice.

Muslim society was somewhat more open socially than the Hindu space. For Bombay in the 1870s, the family of Ayesha, the butcher’s widow, belonged to a diverse social web. A religious scholar supposedly from Baghdad was her preceptor, and he had prepared her husband’s will according to Islamic law83. Whereas *ashraf* men had founded the Deoband madrasa, its students included men of lower status backgrounds, who found clear opportunities for upward mobility in careers as *maulvis*84.

In Bengal, by the 1911 Census, and in children’s school registration, literally millions were reporting for themselves *ashraf* appellations – Shaikh was especially popular. Such claims were a matter of self-designation – and these did contribute to heightened self-esteem. This movement was strong enough to override the old *ashraf* resistance85. Reporting on fieldwork in 1966-67 in what became Bangladesh, Bertocci (1972)86 noted ‘an absolute decline in the number of Muslim ‘caste’ or ‘caste-like’ groups’, a weakening of the caste matrix, and ‘the emergence of a broadly homogeneous Muslim peasant class’87.

Men in *ajlaf* ranks have clearly found opportunities for upward social mobility and have sometimes gained assimilation in higher status groups. When we speak of caste groups among Muslims, the primary reference is to a restrictive regulation of marriages; but that too lacked scriptural support in Islam. For an upwardly mobile family to intermarry with higher status groups has been difficult, yet possible, among Muslims); it used to be 88virtually impossible among Hindus. For such men, therefore, there was not much motivation to look back and organise their castemates for contesting caste-linked social disabilities. (Imtiaz Ahmad [1973] has an account of the tactics used by Muslim families of Kayastha background to gain recognition as high status Sheikhs of ancient lineage.)89

We see then that caste-like disabilities among Muslims have not been harsh enough to set in motion caste-based revolts, led from below. What was a major spur for ‘social reform’ among Hindus was almost completely missing among the Muslims. The religious identity trumped the caste differences. A caste identity has been something to live down, not play up, among Muslims. Consequently, Muslim elites could simply ignore these caste-like differences as a non-issue.

The liberal Muslims: Mushirul Hasan has recently explored the other alternative: a cluster of liberal Muslims in late nineteenth century Delhi, and the diverse activities around *qasbas*, the small towns in Awadh. Their leading lights were Nazir Ahmad, the pioneering novelist in Urdu, and Zakaullah, the prolific author of modern textbooks, and friend of C. F. Andrews, who wrote a biography of Zakaullah. These men were
remarkable for their wide circles of friends and their curiosity about various realms of knowledge, and the diversity of their pursuits. Their past had included the shared experience of Delhi College before 1857, but their number overall was small. While they remain interesting individuals, apart from Syed Ahmad Khan’s College at Aligarh, and possibly Nazir Ahmed’s novels, their work did not make a lasting impression, possibly because many of their social class had migrated to the qasba towns in the wake of 1857.

Those qasbas, the small urban settlements dotting Awadh, the area around Lucknow, were led by large land-controllers. Qasbas were ‘heirs of the once-powerful Indo-Persian culture’ and ‘centres of Islamic piety, and of literary and cultural effervescence’. These could boast of an unusually active intelligentsia. Even as their landed properties contracted, their energies flowed into literary effort especially around poetry, biography, and journalism, into political activity, and into bureaucratic careers. Hasan refers briefly to a project for building a college at Dehra Dun that, in the event, could not be built there.

‘Social reform’ was a major theme in Indian history since the nineteenth century. Reforms in the Muslim space, however, have tended to be weak on secular debate, struggle, and breaks with traditional arrangements. In all the social and ideological flux, the weightier moves have tended rather to reinforce religious and social orthodoxy and to foster a more rigorous Islamisation, anchored to mosque, madrasa, and – in eastern Bengal – anjuman, religious associations. Given a strong current against heterodox belief and practice, the range of lifeways, experiences, and choices available to Muslims became somewhat narrower than might otherwise have been the case. In the matter of reforming women’s place in society, the ulama, acting in alliance with ‘Muslim social reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’, promoted a regime which ‘increasingly asserted male control and values over women’s lives’ in educational, social, and legal arenas.

If studying at government institutions was necessary for getting jobs, the ulama authorised such study. Samaddar writes of famous preachers in early twentieth century Bengal, urging Muslims to get modern education. Why the number of Muslims willing to engage vigorously with the Western tradition was disproportionately small, in several parts of India, remains unclear. The reasons for this may be similar to the reasons for their inability to bring vigour to building institutions of modern education.

The experience of building institutions, and especially many different kinds of institutions, is important. It helps advance the particular purposes for which specific institutions are established; and one gains the experience of building institutions that may be deployed to other purposes. T.N. Madan and B.G. Halbar noted that, after 1854, the colonial government and the missionaries held back from building educational institutions in India, leaving room for ‘private Indian enterprise’; and by 1882 the number of institutions built and run by Indians had grown dramatically. Their study considered three districts in present-day Karnataka: Dharwar and Belgaum in the north, Mysore in the south, concentrating on ‘prominent private educational societies’. They found the Brahmins, Lingayats, and Christians to be ‘the most active in educational private enterprise’, establishing institutions – for primary, secondary, and collegiate education –
which would then be controlled by the promoting community, though teachers, and especially students, came from diverse backgrounds. Of the categories other than these three, Muslims were the most enterprising, in the Anjuman-e-Islam of Hubli, but it had built only secondary schools. Their activity in this area may have been limited because their institutions employed Urdu as the medium of instruction, as against Kannada and English in the others. While only Christians and Brahmans exceeded the Muslims’ literacy level, the authors judged them as educationally backward.  

The Madan and Halbar study traces a part of the pattern of ‘educational private enterprise’ in India in recent generations. The variety of promoters have included religious sects, castes, and successful merchants or industrialists in the philanthropic mode.

In sum, whatever the importance of caste identities for orienting personal, intimate relationships, at least Muslims in north India have had difficulty harnessing the social capital embodied in intra-caste networks for sustained public effort, say building secular institutions. Nor has such effort availed much of the social capital being formed in the emerging networks and sentiments of community, the umma, beyond the madrasas, Aligarh Muslim University, and, later, Jamia Millia Islamia.

Clearly, there was a deficit in the resource base available to the potential Muslim institution builders. Syed Ahmad Khan relied heavily on the colonial government for starting the College at Aligarh – out of which the University grew later. Whether the institution has lived up to its founder’s dream is a moot point. Despite the resource deficit, Jamia Millia Islamia was initiated in the 1920s, as a nationalist project; Gandhi, and the two great physicians, Ajmal Khan and M. A. Ansari, are mentioned as mobilising funds for Jamia in its early phase. Initial deficits notwithstanding, resolute promoters can often muster the resources requisite. Muslims as a category in colonial India and since, it seems, have been too distracted to generate the motivation needed for building modern institutions.

Drawing on the work of both sociologists and historians, this essay has sought the key processes over the centuries that have gone into the making of the Muslim social space in south Asia. The often-invoked Sufis did loom large in the expansion of Islam in South Asia, facilitated in many regions by Muslim rulers – even if the latter resisted occasional pressures from Sunni Islamic orthodoxy to be more peremptory. The nineteenth century found a large, dispersed, unorganised category of persons who might be identified as Muslim but – the immigrants’ descendants apart – the prevailing beliefs and practices were ‘syncretist’ in various measures, given the indigenous origin of the vast majority of the Muslims.

Opening under a new political rule, that century turned out to be a rather contentious time: in some regions, the local social and political equations had to be re-set, with much advancing, and resisting, of rival claims. The early vocabularies of public contention revived older irritants – music before mosque, cow sacrifice at Id – symbols that stoked religious embers. The scale and the depth of the contention took a rising spiral in later generations, aided by the printing presses and new institutional forms, and
spurred by one’s rivals’ own ambitious moves. All together, it reconfigured social arrangements towards relatively clear-cut religious and social identities: the *umma*, in the case of Muslims, a sense of solidarity which has carried weight in the political domain too.

The century and a half leading to the Partition also revealed some constitutive deficits in the Muslim space. One deficit concerned merchants, especially in regions other than Gujarat, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu; and for projects like Aligarh College the Sunni establishment of north India was unable to tap the resources, say, of the Khojas and Bohras, who were Shia. The other deficit lay in the area of an open-minded *critical* tradition, notwithstanding its distinguished record under the Abbasids and in the Maghreb, so that the movement for Islamic purism, led by the *ulama* of Deoband, did not meet much resistance among Muslims. These two deficits combined to produce a third: even as the colonial government left the field of educational institutions to private institution-building initiatives, Muslims appeared at times to be not very interested in mainline schooling, let alone in building institutions for the purpose. As the decades passed, these deficits – over a mercantile and, later, an entrepreneurial class, over an open-minded appreciation of the diverse forms of knowledge, science, and technology, and in promoting the building of institutions – would influence the Muslim responses to emerging social and political issues.
ENDNOTES

1 The scarcity of basic enquiry – and, even more, conceptualising – concerning Muslims in India is reflected in the early major reviews of Indian society. See for details M. N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); Nirmal Kumar Bose, “The Hindu Method of Tribal Absorption”, Science and Culture, 7 (1941); and David G. Mandelbaum, Society in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). Subsequently, both in his editing and in his own studies, Madan has contributed significantly to our understanding of Muslims in India.


3 This was a difficulty in the otherwise admirable early editorial enterprise of Imtiaz Ahmad. See Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., Caste and Social Stratification Among the Muslims (New Delhi: Manohar, 1973).


6 A full treatment of the theme would require, too, consideration of the diverse ideologies – political, social, and religious – that went into shaping the minds of Muslims in different parts of the sub-continent at different times. That task lies beyond the limits of my competence.

7 For a comprehensive, nuanced reconsideration of the theme, see Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri, “Society and Culture of the Tribal World in Colonial Eastern India: Reconsidering the Notion of “Hinduization” of Tribes” in Hetukar Jha, ed., Perspectives on Indian Society and History. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002).


10 Dominique-Sila Khan, Conversions and Shifting Identities: Ramdev Pir and the Ismailis in Rajasthan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997), p. 221.

11 I thank Shail Mayaram for loaning me her copy of Dominique-Sila Khan’s work. Among the converts were two communities of folk musicians in Rajasthan, Langa and Manganiyar, who ‘converted’ to Islam in the medieval period, but remained fully engaged with the regional society. For details, see Rustom Bharucha, Rajasthan: An Oral History - Conversations with Komal Kothari (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 181-188. Kothari believes that occupational and low-caste groups took to Islam because it advocates equality and holds out the possibility of salvation for everyone.

12 Khan, Conversions and Shifting Identities, p. 31. According to him, the Bohras were constituted in Gujarat during the twelfth century, following earlier Isma’ili activity. Also in ch.2 and 03 S.C. Misra, Muslim Communities in Gujarat: Preliminary Studies in their History and Social Organisation (Bombay: Asia, 1964). Subsequently, Bohras received much hostile attention from Sunni Muslim rulers of Gujarat, and underwent several splits.

Ibid., p. 224.

Ibid., p.220f.

Ibid., p.246.

Ibid., pp.269-75.

Ibid., pp. 275-81, and also see Asim Roy, *The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Roy’s work is foundational for our understanding of the first two phases of this process.


Ibid., p.257.

Ibid., p.07.

Ibid., p.218.


Ibid., p.221f.

In the late 1980s, Dagar Brothers conducted an evening course of Dhrupad music at a home where senior brother stressed the affinity between the Dhrupad style of singing and Vedic chanting. He added that his ancestors had been Brahmans; but because they performed at the Mughal court, their caste-mates broke off relations with them; and therefore, his ancestors had taken to Islam.


See for details, Shail Mayaram, *Resisting Regimes: Myth, Memory and the Shaping of a Muslim Identity* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).


Relatively small numbers of Hindu literati, merchants, and took to Islam. For details see Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., *Caste and Social Stratification*. He has written of an ex-Kayastha group, known as Sheikh Siddique, in Allahabad and Lucknow. The motivations and the circumstances for change of faith in these stray cases have been diverse.


Ibid., pp.41-46.


For details see Francis Robinson, *The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001).


For details see Rao and Chowdhary, *Evolution of Political Islam*.


Ahmed, *The Bengal Muslim*. p.41, and also see Chapter 4 in the same text.


One searches in vain for a significant Muslim merchant in C.A Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), also see Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*, p.15; and Mohammad Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967, reprinted in 1995). This study is centred on Northern India, with its Saltanat and Mughal regimes. In its 19-page index, the categories ‘traders’, ‘merchants’ and ‘commerce’ are missing – though there are references to ‘trade routes’ and to Arabs, trading along the west coast.


Also see Claude Markovits, “Businessmen and the Partition of India”, in Tripathi, ed., *Business and Politics in India*, p.289.


Ibid., p.55.

Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, pp.750-945. He considers the centrality of merchants to the Abbasids.


In Kanpur, the most successful Muslim merchants, dealers in foreign goods, moved in the late 1920s ‘to large shops located prominently on one of the main roads’; but they found themselves pitted against the Hindu networks dominating the Municipality on one side and, on the other, gangsters on the prowl during the 1931 riots. See for details Sandria B. Freitag, *Collective Action*

59Subramanian and Ray, Merchant and Politics, p.27.

60Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses and Kings.


66Ibid.


68Misra, Muslim Communities in Gujarat, pp.22ff, 45.


70By the nineteenth century, the old Sufi saints’ tombs – as at Nizamuddin in Delhi, Ajmer, and many in Punjab – remained as dispensers of \textit{barakat}, grace, and they remain, in music and otherwise, symbols of a gentle, open-ended, religious search. In Punjab, the colonial regime had relied on support from custodians of the old establishments; and, by the 1946 elections, the Muslim League was able to draw some of them to its own banner. See for details Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, pp.213-22. As a tradition in which to seek fresh religious experience, however, it seems to have declined under pressure of scripturalist Islam on one side and abrasive Hindutva on the other. For details see Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, and also see Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and his Movement, 1870-1920 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).


72Ahmed, The Bengal Muslim, p.161f.

73For UP, Freitag has documented this sectarian contention leads to heightened consciousness of larger tradition: between Deobandis and Barelwis among Muslims in Bareilly in the 1870s; between Arya Samajis and Sanatan Dharmis among Hindus in Agra in the 1880s. For details see, Freitag, Collective Action and Community, pp. 17,141f.

74We have learned to recognise that conflicts have multiple levels. Rivals may compete in an orderly manner – or otherwise. Political parties caught in intense rivalry may yet be united in allegiance to the Constitution – and the country’s territorial integrity; or, lacking such shared allegiance, these may work for splitting a country. The issues are discussed in N Jayaram, and S. Saberwal, eds., Social Conflict (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.496f.


76Saberwal, “Integration and Separation of Traditions.”

78Hasan, From Pluralism to Separatism.
80For Awadh in UP see Hasan, From Pluralism to Separatism, p.14f, for Bihar see Ghosh, “Partition’s Biharis,” p.26f, and for Bengal see Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, p.22f.
81I thank Raziuddin Aquil for directing me to this paper. Current work by Arshad Alam explores the scene in UP.
82Siddiqi, “Ayesha’s World”, p.120.
83Ibid., pp.119-21.
84Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, p.245f; Similarly in Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, p.29.
85Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, pp.113-19.
87Ibid., p.33.
88Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, pp.13, 19, 118.
89Ahmad, ed., Caste and Social Stratification.
90Hasan, A Moral Reckoning.
91Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics, p.160. Also see Hasan, From Pluralism to Separatism, pp.17, 44, 140, 156.
94Ibid., pp.133-36. The response to modern education among Muslims in Tamil Nadu has been similar, for details see The Political Evolution of Muslims, pp.50-87; but in the context of widespread Left politics in recent decades, the Moplah in northern Kerala have shown remarkable initiatives in institution building in modern education, see for details Roland E. Miller, Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study of Islamic Trends (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1976), pp. 204-21. I thank Mushirul Hasan for this reference.
95For Arya Samaj see Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976).